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RESUMEN: El propósito de este artículo es analizar las variedades 
de Capitalismo que emergieron en Latinoamérica y la Europa Central 
del Este desde 1980 como ejemplos de transferencia institucional. 
En el artículo considero la posibilidad de que el capitalismo, al igual 
que la democracia, es un complejo paquete institucional antes que 
una institución elemental. Algunos de sus componentes viajan más 
rápido que otros a través de formas híbridas, constituyendo, por tan-
to, nuevas perspectivas con potencial suficiente para ser institucio-
nalizadas.
PALABRAS CLAVE: Innovación; Capitalismo; institución; institucio-
nalización; transferencia; sociedad.
IntroductIon
The purpose of this paper is to examine the varieties of 
capitalism that emerged in the transitional societies of 
Latin America and Central-Eastern Europe since the 1980’s 
as instances of institutional transfer.
In the two cases, the transitions were initiated by state and 
political elites, following the demise of relatively closed 
and etatized capitalist economies (what I call autarkic 
capitalism) and in most cases authoritarian regimes in the 
first of these regions, and of state socialism in the second. 
In the cases in which business elites were strong (some 
in Latin America), they also took part in the process of 
institutional innovation. In some cases, the objective was 
the establishment of open market capitalism, along the 
lines of the United States and Western European models, 
and in others a neo-mercantilist economy, in which the 
economy, and the capitalists, serve the interests of the 
state. Both programs of social transformation have en-
tailed the large-scale privatization of government-owned 
firms and at least some de-regulation. The open-market 
model required in addition more substantial de-regulation 
and the opening-up of the economy1. These processes have 
been more radical, of course, in the case of European state 
socialism, where all the firms had been part of the state, 
central planning determined the relations among firms 
and between firms and consumers, and trade and capital 
flows with the world capitalist economy were of secon-
dary significance. However, autarkic capitalist economies 
in Latin America were based on large public sectors, which 
included transportation and manufacturing firms, their 
private firms operated behind very high tariff barriers and 
were, to a large extent, dependent on the state for finan-
cing and international trade; and their economies were 
highly regulated.
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1.  the dIvergent outcomes of the economIc 
transItIon
After about three decades of economic transitions, the 
outcomes are diverse, and for the sake of expediency they 
can be classified into three pure types, which are presented 
in Table 1. The first category corresponds to the cases 
that basically resemble the American or West European 
models, in that they have combined their central traits: 
private property and control of the means of produc-
tion, and relatively open markets for goods (at least for 
non-agricultural ones) and capital. These regimes have 
two characteristics. First, they have limited government, 
in the sense that government regulates central economic 
processes, but it leaves the basic economic decisions to 
the firms. Secondly, their capitalist classes are relatively 
strong: They are autonomous from the government and, to 
a considerable extent, they are internationally competitive. 
The Czech Republic or Poland in Central Europe or Chile 
and Brazil in Latin America would be examples of this 
regime type (See Table 1).
The second group consists of countries whose capitalism is 
characterized by a higher control of the productive sectors 
of the economy by the state, even though private pro-
perty still prevails, and substantial restrictions to market 
mechanisms, especially in relation to international trade 
and investment. These governments are trying to establish 
neo-mercantilist regimes, for they view economic develop-
ment, industrialization in particular, primarily as a means 
for increasing the power of the state. Regimes of this sort 
are akin to the autarkic capitalist ones that emerged in 
the middle of the XXth Century in Latin America and Spain. 
This pattern leads to a state that owns a large sector of the 
economy and very strongly regulates manufacturing, natu-
ral resources, and other strategically important sectors; and 
Even though, in most cases, these processes of institu-
tional adoption were endogenous, the transitions were 
also influenced by external demonstration effects, both 
positive and negative; and they were facilitated by ex-
ternal economic and political factors: the globalization of 
markets for goods and capital and the support offered by 
major Western powers, both directly and via international 
financial agencies.
After two or three decades of the inception of this process 
of social transformation, it is quite clear that the outcome 
has been the institutionalization of different types of 
capitalism, and hence of capitalist classes, a result that 
is puzzling from the perspective of institutionalist theory. 
I will propose a typology of these outcomes, and make 
three claims. First, the elites’ guiding principle, which 
determined the institutional design they pursued, was 
the control of uncertainty: The pre-existing institutions 
had failed, but the elites’ objective was to put in place 
new ones that would, as much as possible, protect their 
interests. Of course, the extent to which the outcomes 
matched the intentions varied considerably, as we will see. 
Second, the successful transfer of complex institutions 
such as capitalism and democracy requires a substantial 
congruence between these institutions and attributes of 
at least two critical components of the broader institu-
tional framework in the recipient society, the state and 
civil society. The third proposition is to a large extent 
the corollary of the previous ones: Capitalism, as well as 
democracy, is a complex institutional package, rather than 
an elementary institution, and some of its components 
“travel” more easily than others, hence the hybrid forms. 
These, rather than being instances of imperfect transplan-
tation, or intermediate stages in a process of successful 
transfer, represent new frameworks, with potential for 
institutionalization.
TABLE 1: VARIETIES OF TRANSITIONAL CAPITALISM
TYPE OF CAPITAL-ISM INTEGRATION WORLD ECON. SUBORD. TO STATE RISK-TAKING ORIENTATION
OPEN MARKET high low high
NEO-MERCANT. selective (as agent of the state, low otherwise) very high low (rent-seeking)
ANEMIC low low/med. low (speculation)
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2.  varIetIes of transItIonaL capItaLIsm and 
InstItutIonaLIst theory
The obvious question is whether this diversity of outcomes 
represents a stage in a process of convergence, a proposi-
tion consistent with sociological institutionalism, or the 
crystallization of new frameworks for the organization of 
the economy (and polity, given the variation in political 
outcomes), as the multiple modernities approach would 
expect.
Institutionalism presupposes a mechanism of institutio-
nalization: Modifications in the normative environment 
alter the incentives and constraints that shape individual 
preferences (in some versions) or their routines, scripts, 
and schemas (in others)2. As a consequence, individuals 
change their behavior, and their new practices reinforce 
the rules and contribute to their stability.
With respect to major institutional frameworks, such as 
forms of economic or state organization in the modern 
world, the sociological variant of new institutionalism 
would predict isomorphic tendencies, either as a conse-
quence of imitation (e.g. the transitions in most of Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe and Latin America), or coercion 
(e.g. Afghanistan or Iraq today). Dependence, uncertainty, 
perception of relative efficacy, and the shortage of visible 
organizational alternatives would be the determinants of 
mimetic processes3. In Walter Powell and John DiMag-
gio’s formulation, “organizations tend to model themselves 
after similar organizations that they perceive to be more 
legitimate or successful”4. Of course, for states and major 
societal actors in the semi-periphery or periphery of the 
world system in the second half of the XX Century, the 
market economy (as well as liberal democracy in the po-
lity) appeared to enjoy these qualities. The central agents 
of the double transitions we are discussing have been state 
elites, and states, in the words of John Meyer et al., “... are 
more isomorphic than most theories would predict, and 
change more uniformly than is commonly recognized”5. 
Therefore, the transfer of institutional frameworks across 
societies should, in the end, produce strong pressures to-
ward convergence.
If the variety of the outcomes of economic liberalization 
is puzzling from the point of view of institutionalism, it 
is rather consistent with a contending approach, multiple 
a capitalist class that is subordinate to the state (in the ex-
treme case, a “crony capitalist” class), and non-competitive 
internationally, except in areas of strategic significance for 
the government, and in which the bourgeoisie functions as 
the government’s agent. Russia and Venezuela are examples 
of this pattern.
Finally, many countries are characterized by weak states, 
incapable of regulating the economy effectively and of 
providing a strong level of rule of law, and weak capitalist 
classes, whose capacity for interest articulation vis-à-vis 
the government and for international competitiveness 
are very limited. This outcome is an anemic form of 
capitalism. Ukraine and Ecuador or Paraguay are cases 
in point.
These three types of capitalist class tend to be orien-
ted toward different types of economic behavior. In the 
countries whose institutional framework is more similar 
to that of the Western model, capitalists will be more 
likely to take risks, for instance by investing with long-
term horizons, and to integrate themselves more in the 
international economy as autonomous participants. In 
the second case, capitalists will accommodate to the 
neo-mercantilist environment by seeking from the state 
guaranteed markets, i.e. they will become rentiers. When 
they venture abroad, they will do so only with strong 
government support and guidance. Finally, capitalists in 
countries with weak states are likely to focus almost 
exclusively on production for domestic markets and en-
gage mostly in speculation and other investments with 
short-term horizons.
The outcomes of the political transitions have also been 
heterogeneous. The demise of the previous authoritarian 
and post-totalitarian regimes (the former in most of Latin 
America, the latter in Central and Eastern Europe) has led, 
in some cases, to polities that resemble the Western models 
(Chile and Uruguay in Latin America, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary or Poland in Central Europe), while, at the other 
extreme, Belarus is a pseudo-democracy, and Russia and 
Venezuela are plebiscitarian regimes with strong authori-
tarian traits. A large proportion of the remaining coun-
tries have low-quality democracies, in which there may 
be elections and oppositions, but in which other aspects 
of democratic governance may be weakly established or 
lacking altogether.
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The building blocks in question are at least two: The stock 
of economic and human capital accumulated in the so-
ciety, and the existence of a substantial capitalist class 
(even if this class does not operate within the framework 
of an open market economy), a well-developed manage-
rial stratum, and functioning banks. In turn, these building 
blocks are a function of the degree of development, and of 
whether the pre-existing institutions were autarkic-capi-
talist or state-socialist. The degree of development would 
explain the degree of industrialization, the concentration 
of capital, the quality of schools and universities and 
therefore the stock of human capital, etc. The nature of the 
pre-existing economic institutions accounts for whether, 
in the beginning of economic liberalization, there was a 
capitalist class and the legal framework of capitalism was 
in place. From this point of view, autarkic capitalism was a 
favorable condition for the transition to an open market 
regime, even if in this regime market mechanisms were 
severely limited. On the other hand, some other condi-
tions for the consolidation of new economic institutions 
were usually more favorable in state socialist societies: 
These countries were likely to have built, in the beginning 
of the transition, a substantial managerial stratum and a 
larger stock of human capital than their autarkic capitalist 
counterparts at similar levels of industrialization.
In the second place, there is the tradition that considers 
a country’s position in the world economy as a central 
determinant of its internal institutions. All transitional 
economies are peripheral, but there is a special case, that 
of large-scale exporters of oil or other natural resources 
that generate large rents. There is by now a large body of 
literature showing that this location in the international 
system has negative consequences not only for the con-
struction of an effective market economy but for develop-
ment in general (the “curse of natural resources”)11.
Most analyses of transitions to market capitalism have 
focused on different aspects of the countries’ economic 
legacy. However, this factor is not strongly correlated with 
the outcomes we have seen above. The Central and Eas-
tern European countries and the most important ones in 
Latin America are in the middle stages of development, as 
measu red by per capita gDP, most had in the beginning 
of the transitions large and non-competitive industrial 
sectors, and several are large-scale exporters of natural 
resources. The first of these regions had state-socialist 
modernities6. According to S.N. Eisenstadt, “The appro-
priation of different themes and institutional patterns of 
the original Western modern civilization in non-Western 
European societies... entailed the continuous selection, 
reinterpretation and reformulation of such themes, ... 
[producing]... new cultural and political programmes of 
modernity, and... new institutional patterns”7. As Bjorn 
Wittrock puts it, diffusion is limited by the fact that non-
Western societies “remain characterized by the form they 
acquired during much earlier periods of cultural crystal-
lization”8 (and institutional crystallization as well, I would 
add).
Some sociological institutionalists are aware of this fact. 
Meyer et al., in particular, point out the prevalence of 
partial decoupling: “Some external elements are easier 
to copy than others, and many external elements are 
inconsistent with local practices, requirements, and cost 
structures”9. In any case, the multiple modernities ap-
proach introduces a heuristically important corrective to 
the convergence thesis. The problem with multiple mo-
dernities, though, is that it is little more than a perspec-
tive, which still lacks more specific propositions, let alone 
testable ones.
I will argue that the dynamics of institutional transplan-
tation is a function of the interaction between imported 
elements and the frameworks onto which these elements 
are grafted. The degree of successful isomorphism would 
depend on the extent of congruence between critical areas 
of the institutional framework of the recipient society and 
the requirements of the new rules and practices. There-
fore, similar institutional frameworks, when transferred to 
societies with different institutional trajectories and the 
cultures attached to them, would almost necessarily result 
in diverse outcomes.
3.  economIc LegacIes and transItIonaL capItaLIsm
Sociologists aiming to explain the diversity of transitional 
economic institutions would find two independent va-
riables in their standard tool-kit: the presence or absence 
in these countries of the building blocks of the market 
economy, and the countries’ location in the world economy 
in the beginning of the transition10.
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independence. This may mean an orientation toward 
open-market capitalism in some cases and toward neo-
mercantilism in others. Thus, in post-communist Europe, 
central European and Baltic state elites oriented their 
institutional design toward open market capitalism in or-
der, among other factors, to be able to join the European 
Union and NATO, and thus extract themselves from the 
Russian sphere of influence. On the other hand, Belarus 
was so involved economically and culturally with Russia, 
and its political institutions were so similar to Russia’s, 
that neo-mercantilism appeared as the only viable op-
tion. Ukraine is as a contested case, in which different 
segments of the political elite pursue different models of 
economic design12.
This factor is not relevant for states that do not face a hos-
tile or potentially hostile environment. In Latin America, 
no state experienced a geo-political threat, so the cen-
tral determinant of institutional design was the relation 
of forces between states and capitalists13. In the absence of 
substantial geo-political constraints of the type described 
above, there are two scenarios, described in propositions 
two and three below.
Second, when the capitalist class is strong vis-à-vis the 
state and is internationally competitive, the outcome of 
institutional design is likely to be open-market capita-
lism. This kind of capitalist class is powerful enough to 
fend off a state bureaucracy seeking to subordinate it to 
its directives, and it can do so because it does not need 
captive domestic markets or guaranteed foreign engage-
ments that would be the counterpart to its subordination 
to the state. In Latin America, Chile is a case in point. The 
trajectory of economic policy in Brazil offers an interesting 
example: Since the beginning of the transition, there has 
been a gradual strengthening of this country’s capitalist 
class, and in parallel a switch toward more open economic 
policies, designed to enhance the country’s integration into 
the world economy.
Third, a capitalist class that is weak vis-à-vis the state 
and/or non-competitive internationally will welcome a 
neo-mercantilist outcome, and it may even push for it. 
For capitalists in these situations, the surrender of their 
autonomy in a neo-mercantilist arrangement maybe their 
only viable course of action. Russia, where the state and 
private capitalists are intertwined, is a clear example. Ve-
regimes and the second autarkic capitalist ones, and yet 
there is a variety of outcomes within each group of coun-
tries. A case for the correlation between location in the 
world economy as an oil exporter and type of capitalism, 
the “curse of natural resources” argument, could still be 
made, based on the fact that both Russia and Venezue-
la have neo-mercantilist regimes; but Mexico does not. 
Therefore, economic legacies matter, but they do not ap-
pear to be the main cause of regime variation.
I turn now to the discussion of two factors that, in my 
view, provide a better account for the variability of capi-
talist institutions in transitional societies: the types of 
design sought by state elites in their quest to reduce 
uncertainty, and the degree of congruence between the 
new institutions and critical areas of the broader institu-
tional framework of the society. Finally, I will argue that 
the cause of the hybrid institutional forms resides in the 
fact that capitalism (and democracy as well) is a complex 
institution, some of whose components can be more easily 
transplanted than others.
4.  transItIonaL eLItes and the controL 
of uncertaInty
As I pointed out above, elites conducting institutional in-
novations will try to reduce uncertainty by shaping the 
outcome of the process in order to reduce the uncertainty 
inherent to a massive social transformation. Their ideal 
goal is to protect and, if possible, advance their interests 
in the new institutional setting they are bringing into 
reality.
If we focus on state elites in the beginning of the transi-
tion, their decision to pursue open market capitalism or 
neo-mercantilism depends upon two factors: the relative 
strength of the state vis-a vis other states, and of the 
capitalist class vis-à-vis the state, on the one hand, and 
the world economy on the other. The argument can be 
summarized into three propositions.
First, the elites of states that are relatively weak in re-
lation to potentially threatening hegemonic states are 
likely to orient the design of economic institutions in a 
way that maximizes the chances for their survival and 
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tem based on contracts, both explicit and implicit, cannot 
operate effectively.
Contractual interactions among firms and individuals run 
smoothly when the agreements they are based on, and the 
rules under which they operate, are validated by a tacit or, 
when necessary, manifest third-party enforcer, a function 
that only the state can perform. Carrying out this task 
requires a strong state, but such a state, when not limited 
by institutional barriers or the counterweight of powerful 
social forces, may be subject to the logic of organizational 
expansion: The state, after all, is an organization, and 
organizations strive, whenever possible, to extend control 
over their environments. A vigorous state facing a weak 
society might become a variety of Mancur Olson’s “sta-
tionary bandit”15, a predatory state; or even Tocqueville’s 
despotic one16. Even if government leaders exercise self-
restraint, the major social and economic actors would fear 
such encroachment as a serious possibility, a consideration 
that would affect their economic behavior. This is why an 
effective market economy requires not only a strong state 
but also a strong civil society, whose function is to balance 
the state and prevent predatory behavior or despotism.
Thus, the successful transfer of market capitalism depends 
on the presence, within the broader institutional frame-
work of the society, of a relatively strong state and civil 
society. When both are weak, the result is what I have 
called above anemic capitalism. A combination of a strong 
state and a weak civil society produces an environment 
prone to neo-mercantilism (See Table 2).
State capacity and civil society strength are murky con-
cepts. Only certain types of capacity are of strategic sig-
nificance for the establishment of a market economy, and 
civil society is defined in so many different ways that the 
concept requires clarification.
nezuela, with a much weaker bourgeoisie, would be a Latin 
American case.
In any case, it is crucial to distinguish between elite 
goals and the objective outcomes of their actions. All 
transitional state elites engage in institutional design, 
but results vary. The degree to which their objectives are 
accomplished depends, of course, on many factors related 
to the agents we have discussed, but success is largely 
contingent on the capabilities of their instrument, the 
state apparatus, regulatory and extractive capabilities in 
particular, a topic to which I will return. The question is 
whether this instrument, the state, is adequate for the 
task at hand. The institutionalization of the third out-
come I have discussed, anemic capitalism, is obviously 
not an intended consequence of elite action. It is the 
result, whatever the elites’ objectives, of a state with 
low capacities, especially in situations in which capita-
lists are non-competitive internationally. This is, in the 
regions we are discussing, a frequent correlate of sate 
state weakness.
5.  nodes of InstItutIonaL congruence
The contemporary theory of capitalism suggests that two 
critical nodes for the articulation between an open market 
economy and the broader institutional framework of the 
recipient society are a property of the state, its capacity, 
and a characteristic of the social structure, the strength of 
civil society14. A high-performance open market economy 
presupposes a state with certain capacities, especially the 
ability to establish a strong protection for property rights 
(not only for the owners of capital, but also for workers, 
savers, and consumers) and, more generally, a robust rule 
of law, without which market capitalism, an economic sys-
TABLE 2: THE INSTITUTIONAL MATRIX OF TRANSITIONAL CAPITALISM
TYPE OF TRANSITIONAL CAPITALISM STATE CAPACITY CIVIL SOCIETY STRENGTH
OPEN MARKET HIgH (regulatory/extractive) HIgH
NEO-MERCANTILISM HIgH (coercive) LOW
ANEMIC LOW LOW
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distributive and innovative, are essential for the analysis 
of more specific characteristics of economic institutions, 
and for understanding political regimes)21.
Regulatory capacity refers to the extent to which the 
state is able to guarantee to non-state actors the effec-
tive exercise of their economic, civil, political, and cultural 
rights, and maintain and improve the quality of economic 
and political institutions. The core of this capacity is the 
rule of law, and it also includes the regulation of markets 
and the functioning of the state itself and of political 
institutions. Indicators would be measures of regulatory 
quality, official corruption, and the effectiveness of the 
judiciary. In the second place, extractive capacity denotes 
the state’s ability to appropriate revenue from the society. 
Its indicators would be the amount of direct taxation and 
the rate of tax evasion.
An effective market economy presupposes a substantial 
level of regulatory state capacity: Absent a strong pro-
tection of individual and collective property rights (for 
all economic agents, not just for the owners of capi-
tal), there will be low levels of trust, and the norm will 
be the prevalence of short-term contracts, both explicit 
and implicit; limited use of banks; speculation as the 
predominant form of capital deployment; etc. Moreover, 
a state with insufficient regulatory ability would not 
be able to generate and maintain competitive markets, 
and many areas of economic activity, especially those 
that are technologically stagnant, would be captured by 
rent-seeking agents (often, capitalists, and sometimes, 
unions). In addition, a well-functioning market economy 
requires a level of extractive capacity that would support 
relatively autonomous, technically competent, and hope-
fully transparent state bureaucracies and judiciaries (of 
course, a much higher level of extractive capacity would 
be required for social-democratic capitalism, which is 
based on a dense social safety net and extensive public 
programs in health, education, pensions, and poverty al-
leviation).
If the state is weak, the outcome is likely to be an anemic 
economy. When the state is relatively strong, what I have 
called neo-mercantilism becomes possible. In this regime, 
state strength appears as mainly as coercive capacity, 
ra ther than through the mediation of institutionalized 
 capacities such as the regulatory or extractive ones.
6.  InstItutIonaL congruence at the top: state 
reguLatory capacIty
The question of state capacity, understood as the efficacy 
with which the state executes the tasks it sets for itself, or 
that social forces expect from the state, has been under-
analyzed in the social sciences. From Max Weber on, most 
analyses have focused on whether a state exists in a ter-
ritory, i.e. what Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan have called 
“stateness”17. As a consequence, scholarly attention has 
been concentrated on the estimation of an attribute, the 
monopoly of the legitimate use of force, i.e. the determina-
tion of whether existence a minimal state does exist.
However, state capacity is implicit in Weber’s discussion 
of the bureaucracy as an ideal type, and the issue has been 
addressed by several scholars. Douglass North and Man-
cur Olson have shown that the strength of institutions 
backed by the state, especially the rule of law, is a basic 
determinant of economic and political regimes18. Peter 
Evans and James Rauch have estimated the “weberian-
ness” of agencies involved in economic policy-making in 
middle-developed nations and found that countries whose 
bureaucracies are more meritocratic and whose civil ser-
vice allows for more established careers have higher rates 
of growth19. Francis Fukuyama has made a very important 
distinction between state scope and strength, and has 
discussed systematically the domestic and international 
implications of state weakness in underdeveloped coun-
tries20. Finally, state failure has become a central con-
cern in the contemporary international system, due to its 
implications in relation with terrorism, drug trafficking, 
and money laundering. These analyses have placed the 
question of state capacity at the center of the agenda in 
state research.
Since state capacities may vary across areas of governmen-
tal activity, their analysis can only be multi-dimensional. 
Of course, coercive capacity, or the effectiveness with 
which the state uses its military and security apparatuses, 
is essential and conditions the exercise of all others. When 
this capacity is absent, there is no state (even though there 
could still be a government, as in contemporary Somalia). 
If we assume the existence of a basic level of stateness 
and focus on other areas of state capacity, two are central 
in relation to the economic outcomes we are interested in: 
the regulatory and extractive capacities (others, such as 
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under-privileged. Further, scholarly arguments focus on 
civil society strength, a property that is vaguely specified 
and often misunderstood (e.g. when a highly polarized 
society in which major social forces are well organized is 
characterized as a “strong civil society”23).
Following Tocqueville’s (who did not use the term) and 
gellner’s analysis of the relationship between civil society 
and capitalism24, I will refer to civil society as a slice of so-
ciety, whose core is the web of voluntary associations that 
articulate the interests and values of all sectors of society, 
the powerful as well as the powerless, as long as these 
units are not under the control of the state. Civil society 
may contain communities and eventually civil society as 
a whole may generate a strong community, but it consists 
of associative units. In Weberian terms, civil society may 
subsume affectual collectivities, or Gemeinschaften; but it 
is constituted by Gessellschaften, driven by instrumental or 
value-oriented interests. Of course, this definition excludes 
economic society, and the family and other institutions in 
the private sphere.
In order to conceptualize civil society strength, it is useful 
to consider three analytically distinguishable dimensions 
of civil society: its density, autonomy and degree of self-
regulation. First, density refers to the extent to which all 
the major interest and value communities  existing in the 
society are organized and mobilized. Elites usually are, so 
the issue is the extent to which non-elite social forces are 
also organized and mobilized. Secondly,  autonomy means 
self-rule, rather than absolute independence from the 
state. Of course, there is no reason to assume that civil so-
ciety organizations will always have an anti-governmental 
orientation or will refuse to participate in governmental 
activities. Finally, self-regulation means that the units of 
the associational web, in representing the interests and 
values of their constituencies, function within the insti-
tutional channels of the democratic state. They may form 
coalitions and engage in conflict, but they act within the 
boundaries of the constitution and the laws. Scholarly 
arguments on strong civil society and its effects, from Toc-
queville onwards, make sense only when they characterize 
civil society on the basis of these three dimensions, and 
the variables have high values.
A strong civil society contributes to an effective market 
economy in at least two ways. First, because of the stan-
As I pointed out above, a neo-mercantilist state, rather 
than being a relatively passive regulator of economic re-
lations and a last-resort guarantor of contracts, as the 
standard model of the market economy would require, 
becomes the driving force of economic activity. Since the 
central purpose of economic development is the streng-
thening of the state, both vis-à-vis the society and in 
relation to other states, the government places a large seg-
ment of the economy under its direct control and hyper-
regulates the rest. The state becomes the principal and the 
capitalists its agents. In typical instances, capitalists de-
pend on the government for financing of their operations, 
protection from foreign competition, and the demand for 
their output. Thus, a rent-seeking capitalist class becomes 
the counterpart of a rentier state (the norm among large 
exporters of oil and gas and, hypothetically, other natural 
resources for which cartelized markets are possible). Crony 
capitalism, i.e. a situation in which only capitalists with 
direct ties to the government can thrive and in some cases 
operate, constitutes the ideal type of the capitalist class 
in this regime.
In neo-mercantilism, the state’s regulatory capacity is 
 either weak or selectively applied. The typical configuration 
is one in which the government’s approach to the law is 
contingent and instrumental. Bureaucracies and judiciaries 
are run based on political criteria, their technical capacity 
is low or uneven, and corruption is relatively high. As for 
extractive capacity, it is generally limited as well, for the 
government is largely independent of the society for the 
procurement of revenue: It finances itself with proceeds 
from exports, and the export industries are either publicly 
owned or heavily controlled by the state.
7.  InstItutIonaL congruence outsIde the state: 
cIvIL socIety strength
Civil society is a diffuse concept in the social sciences, 
and the fact that it has entered political discourse has 
limited further its applicability in academic research22. 
Definitions vary widely, from some that encompass every-
thing outside the state to others that restrict the term to 
very specific segments of society, such as the non-profit 
sector, or what writers define as the “good guys” in social 
cleavages, e.g. the NgOs that represent the poor and the 
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congruence between the requirements of the models of 
capitalism being established and the broader framework of 
the recipient societies, but also of the inherent complexity 
of major institutions.
Capitalism is a composite institution, in fact a bundle of 
institutions whose degree of correlation is empirically va-
riable (the same happens with democracy), and some of 
the components of this package are more easily transfer-
able than the others. This is why the outcomes of insti-
tutional transfer vary in terms of their resemblance with 
the ideal models, or with the prototypes that served as 
demonstration effects, as a function of the configuration 
of state capacities and civil society in the countries into 
which institutions are transplanted.
Capitalism involves three central dimensions: the existence 
of private property of the means of production, a free labor 
market in Marx’s sense (i.e. the removal of institutional 
barriers, within a society, to the mobility of labor between 
positions in the economy), and a market for goods and 
capital (i.e. the abolition of substantial restrictions to the 
flows of goods and capital). The most efficient contempo-
rary capitalist economies have reduced these barriers to a 
minimum, for capital and most goods.
The experience of the recent transitions, and in fact the 
historical record since the development of capitalism 
among late industrializers in the XIXth Century, indicates 
that it is easier to establish effectively the private property 
of the means of production and a free labor market than 
the absence of restrictions to the movements of goods 
and capital.
In what I have called the anemic variety of capitalism, all 
the dimensions of capitalism are in place, but they are 
weakly institutionalized. Private property of the means of 
production, and more generally property rights, do exist, 
but they are necessarily feeble in societies in which the 
rule of law is not firmly established. Even a market for la-
bor may not be strongly institutionalized, if labor contracts 
and legislation in general cannot be effectively enforced. 
Markets for goods and capital are fragile and unstable, 
not only due to the weakness of the rule of law and the 
consequent low level of generalized trust, but also because 
capitalists, labor, and the state view high protective bar-
riers as the only means for the preservation of these frail 
dard Tocquevillean argument: a society of this sort gemer-
ate economic and cultural elites independent of the gov-
ernment. These elites balance the power of the state (in a 
democratic regime, not only via direct interest articulation 
but also through its mobilization within the party system 
and, in general, political society), hold it accountable, and 
constitute a barrier to its expansion into predatory or 
despotic directions. Secondly, this web or organized inte-
rest and values communities generates powerful pressures 
for the enhancement of the state capacities that a strong 
market economy requires, i.e. at least the regulatory and 
extractive ones.
Civil society may be weak in the following three si-
tuations: When density is low (typically, this implies that 
the lower classes, or important segments thereof, are 
not organized; as I pointed out above, elites usually are); 
when organizations representing social interests and va-
lues, or at least those representing important groups in 
the society, are controlled by the state (state corporatism 
and clientelism being typical examples); and when both 
density and autonomy are high, but self-regulation is 
low (the high-polarization case described before, e.g. the 
Second Spanish Republic or Weimar germany). In none 
of these cases civil society will balance the state, in the 
first two because of the sheer weakness of its consti tuent 
organizations, and in the third because high levels of po-
larization are likely to trigger either the establishment of 
highly coercive regimes or state breakdown. In addition, 
situations of high polarization, because of the high level 
of uncertainty they entail, lead to deep economic contrac-
tions: paralysis of investment, massive capital flight, etc. 
Typically, what I have called anomic capitalism is char-
acterized by a low-density weak civil society (first case 
above), and neo-mercantilism regimes are prone to the 
second type, state control of society through corporatist 
and clientelistic mechanisms.
8.  uneven InstItutIonaLIzatIon: compLeX 
InstItutIons and the emergence of hybrIds
We are now in a better position to understand the va-
riety of the institutional outcomes of economic transitions. 
However, the heterogeneity of results is not only a con-
sequence of elites’ different objectives and of the variable 
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long-term viability of the hybrid institutional frameworks 
discussed above has been quite neglected by sociologi-
cal reasoning, which has tended to use binary categories 
(capitalist/non capitalist, or capitalism that is early/late, 
or autonomous/dependent, etc.). Yet, the hybrid formu-
lae now flourishing in transitional societies have attained 
varying degrees of legitimacy and efficacy, and some could 
be successfully institutionalized. The understanding of 
these frameworks is essential not only because of their 
importance, both theoretical and empirical, but also for 
the conceptualization of capitalism (and democracy) as 
complex variables.
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law, but restrictions to market mechanisms are inherent 
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the economy and a selective integration into the world 
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national engagements of their economic agents, for they 
view globalization through the prisms of the protection 
of their sovereignty and the potential expansion of their 
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the existence of an effective separation of powers (the 
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